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Abstract—Cloud computing has been an emerging model which aims at allowing customers to utilize computing resources 
hosted by Cloud Service Providers (CSPs). More and more consumers rely on CSPs to supply computing and storage service 
on the one hand, and CSPs try to attract consumers on favorable terms on the other. In such competitive cloud computing 
markets, pricing policies are critical to market efficiency. While CSPs often publish their prices and charge users according to 
the amount of resources they consume, auction mechanism is rarely applied. In fact a feasible auction mechanism is the most 
effective method for allocation of resources, especially double auction is more efficient and flexible for it enables buyers and 
sellers to enter bids and offers simultaneously. In this paper we bring up an electronic auction platform for cloud, and a cloud 
Continuous Double Auction (CDA) mechanism is formulated to match orders and facilitate trading based on the platform. Some 
evaluating criteria are defined to analyze the efficiency of markets and strategies. Furthermore, the selection of bidding 
strategies for the auction plays a very important role for each player to maximize its own profit, so we developed a novel bidding 
strategy for cloud CDA, BH-strategy, which is a two-stage game bidding strategy. At last we designed three simulation scenarios 
to compare the performance of our strategy with other dominating bidding strategies and proved that BH-strategy has better 
performance on surpluses, successful transactions and market efficiency. In addition, we discussed that our cloud CDA 
mechanism is feasible for cloud computing resource allocation. 
Index Terms—cloud computing, continuous double auction, bidding strategies, resource allocation 
——————————      —————————— 
1 INTRODUCTION
ith the development of Information and Communi-
cation Technology, computing will one day be-
come the 5th utility (after water, electricity, gas, telephony) 
[1]. Computing resources are always distributed dispers-
edly, which are connected with networks. How to provide 
transparent computing services for users in such a hetero-
geneous environment is a key problem. To deal with it, a 
number of computing paradigms have been proposed: 
cluster computing, Grid Computing, and more recently 
cloud computing. Cloud computing has been an emerging 
model which aims at allowing customers to utilize com-
putational resources and software hosted by Cloud Ser-
vice Providers (CSPs) [2]. 
There are many famous CSPs, such as Amazon, 
Google, Microsoft, Rackspace, Joyent, GoGrid, Op-
Source, Verizon/Terremark, Citrix, Bluelock, and so on. 
More and more consumers rely on CSPs to supply com-
puting service on the one hand, and CSPs try to attract 
consumers on favorable terms on the other. Take Amazon 
for example, it has been estimated that Amazon EC2 has 
more than 70,000 EC2 server instances per day in 2010 
[3]. At the same time, the scale of CSPs is also increasing 
greatly. 
Obviously the cloud computing utility services have 
created a competitive open market environment. Every 
market participant searches for its own path to the maxi-
mum profit, while a market pricing mechanism should be 
applied to balance supply and demand in real time and 
maintain the market reliability. Just like markets for net-
work resources, the pricing problem has become increas-
ingly urgent. It is clear that if the markets are not properly 
designed, they could function rather poorly, even leading 
to market failure [4]. The traditional Internet was just a 
best-effort service without economic resources allocation, 
which resulted in poor network utility and congestion. 
Therefore many economic and technical approaches for 
network resources scheduling are brought, such as net-
work utility maximization (NUM), network resources 
auction, time-dependence pricing, etc. 
As cloud computing is designed to be a market-
oriented computing paradigm, the effective market model 
and pricing mechanism both are critical for cloud com-
puting to avoid previous Internet problems. 
Now CSPs have their own pricing policies. Usually 
CSPs specify their service price and charge users accord-
ing to the amount of resources they consume, which can 
be called posted-offer pricing model. The pricing policy 
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can be derived from various parameters. For example, 
Amazon EC2 provides different purchasing options, such 
as on-demand instances (paying for computing capacity 
by the hour with no long-term commitments, $0.060 per 
Hour for a small/default instance), reserved instances 
(making a low, one-time payment for each instance you 
want to reserve and in turn receiving a significant dis-
count, $0.034 per Hour for a small/default instance), etc. 
Such a posted-offer pricing model can not incent users to 
consume more resources in off-peak periods or pay more 
in peak periods. Bidding and auction are effective ways to 
solve the above problem. However the auction mecha-
nism is rarely adopted by CSPs. Only Amazon EC2 pro-
vides spot instances allowing customers to bid on unused 
Amazon EC2 capacity and run those instances as long as 
their bid exceeds the current spot price. It is one single-
sided auction model, but more efficient auction models 
can be applied to cloud markets. 
Furthermore, owing to the Internet, the rapid develop-
ment of e-commerce has effectuated an increase in the 
number of users engaged in electronic auction (e-auction) 
services. E-auctions enable bidders to bid for diverse ob-
jects on an electronic platform via Internet [5]. For the 
users often access cloud services via Internet, E-auction is 
also a feasible method to solve cloud resources pricing 
problem. 
Consequently, an e-auction platform can be established, 
on which many CSPs and users trade computing and stor-
age resources online. Moreover the double auction 
mechanism is more competent for cloud markets than 
single-sided auction mechanisms adopted by CSPs at pre-
sent. The buyers and sellers can both submit bids in dou-
ble auctions. In the double auctions, the selection of bid-
ding strategies plays a very important role for each player 
to maximize its own profit. 
This paper makes two major contributions. First, a 
cloud Continuous Double Auction (CDA) mechanism is 
formulated to match orders and facilitate trading based on 
an electronic bidding platform. Second, we develop a 
novel bidding strategy for cloud CDA, BH-strategy, 
which is a two-stage game bidding strategy. At last we 
evaluate the efficiency of our strategy. 
The following of this paper is structured as follows. In 
section 2 the research works on Internet Pricing, Con-
tinuous Double Auction (CDA) and bidding strategies are 
reviewed. Then we discuss challenges to cloud markets 
and bring up the conclusion that the e-Business platform 
is a feasible solution to cloud markets. We design a cloud 
CDA mechanism and e-bidding platform scheme in sec-
tion 4. Section 5 describes our novel bidding strategy for 
cloud CDA. The simulation results are given in section 6. 
Section 7 concludes the paper. 
2 RELATED WORKS 
How to manage and schedule resources economically is 
very important in cloud computing. It has also been re-
searched in grid computing, and some economy resource 
allocation frameworks have been proposed [6]. These 
works can be regarded as an application and extension of 
some market economy theories in computing resources 
markets, the key point of which is to set prices of the 
commodities in the markets. 
Now there are less research works on cloud computing 
pricing than on Internet pricing. But some solutions to the 
latter can be applied to cloud computing, because the al-
location of cloud computing resources is similar to that of 
network resources. Many network pricing policies are 
based on auction mechanism, which are proved efficient. 
In this section we will review Internet resource pricing 
first, and then present related works on auctions. 
2.1 Internet Resource Pricing 
The basic problem in communication networking is how 
to effectively share resources. Dynamic decentralized 
algorithms for network flow optimization have a long 
history, the mathematical theory under which is often 
referred to as network utility maximization (NUM). But it 
has arbitrarily bad efficiency when users behave selfishly 
and strategically. Thus, there is a need to go beyond the 
current distributed optimization-based NUM framework 
to a game-theoretic and market economics based network 
market design (NMD) framework that takes incentive 
issues into account in the design of network resource al-
location algorithms and protocols. 
Recently, with a tremendous growth in demand for 
broadband data, ISPs are forced to use pricing as a con-
gestion management tool. There are flat-rate pricing, us-
age-based pricing, application-based pricing, time-
dependent pricing and so on. But pricing policies with the 
right incentives to shift a demand from congested periods 
to off-peak times are more popular. Such peak-load pric-
ing, off-peak discounts, day-ahead pricing, and real-time 
pricing have an explicit time-dependent pricing feature; 
others, like game-theoretic (auction) models and prioriti-
zation-based models (e.g., smart market, raffle-based, 
token bucket pricing), use more implicit time-varying 
incentives to induce the time-shifting of data to less con-
gested periods [7]. 
Auction and market design solutions to network re-
sources exist in a wide variety of scenarios. Single-sided 
auction designs for divisible goods have been explored 
fairly well. Designing suitable double-sided auctions, or 
markets, has proved to be rather challenging [4]. 
However, there are also differences between the Inter-
net and cloud pricing. While the Internet is widely used 
by many common people, the cloud computing services 
are mainly for scientific computing and websites [8, 9]. 
Compared with common users, cloud users are usually 
more professional and willing to accept e-auction services. 
Therefore, the auction mechanism is feasible for cloud 
markets pricing. 
2.2 Reviews of CDA 
In a real world market, there are various economic mod-
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els for setting the price of services based on supply-and-
demand and their value to users, including commodity 
market, posted prices, tender and auction models. Many 
research works have attempted to apply these economic 
models to grid computing. In the above models bidding 
and auction have high potential for computing resource 
allocation in gird or cloud environments. But there are 
few researches engaged to analyze CSPs bidding strate-
gies on game theory approach, which is important prob-
lem in biding and auction.  
The auction model supports one-to-many or many-to-
many negotiations, between a service provider (sellers) 
and many consumers (buyers), and reduces negotiations 
to a single value (i.e. price). Auctions can be conducted as 
open or closed depending on whether they allow back-
and-forth offers and counter offers. The consumer may 
update the bid and the provider may update the offered 
sale price. Depending on these parameters, auctions can 
be classified into the following types: English Auction 
(first-price open cry), first-price sealed-bid auction, sec-
ond-price sealed-bid auction (Vickrey auction), Dutch 
auction and double auction. 
Gode and Sunder [10] divided double auction into 
three categories: Synchronized Double Auction, Continu-
ous Double Auction (CDA) and Semi-continuous Double 
Auction (or Hybrid Double Auction). 
CDA is one of the most common forms of market-
places and has emerged as the dominant financial institu-
tion for trading securities and financial instruments. In-
deed, today the major exchanges, like the NASDAQ and 
the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) and the major 
foreign exchange (FX), apply variants of the CDA institu-
tion [11]. Other significant applications are in market-
based control, where CDAs provide a dynamic and effi-
cient approach to the decentralized allocation of scarce 
resources [12]. 
In the CDA model, buy orders (bids) and sell orders 
(offers or asks) may be submitted at anytime during the 
trading period. If at any time there are open asks and bids 
that match or are compatible in terms of prices and re-
quirements (e.g., quantity of goods or shares), a trade is 
executed immediately. In this auction, orders are ranked 
from the highest to the lowest to generate demand and 
supply profiles. From the profiles, the maximum quantity 
exchanged can be determined by matching asks (starting 
with the lowest price and moving up) with demand bids 
(starting with the highest price and moving down). Re-
searchers have developed software-based agent mecha-
nisms to automate double auction for stock trading with 
or without human interaction [13]. 
Bidding strategy is an important problem in CDA, and 
many strategies for CDA have been subsequently devel-
oped. Over the last decade, there has been a considerable 
emphasis on strategies for software trading agents with 
the emergence of electronic markets [14], such as Zero-
Intelligence (ZI) strategy [15], Zero-Intelligence Plus 
(ZIP) strategy [16], GD strategy [17], its subsequent ex-
tension GDX [18], p-strategy [19], k-Zero-Intelligence 
strategy [20], AA (Adaptive Aggressive) strategy [11], 
and so on. 
Furthermore, with the development of Internet and e-
Business, CDA is also adopted by many e-auction sites, 
such as FastParts, LabX, Dallas Gold and Silver Ex-
change. 
If a CDA mechanism can be designed for cloud mar-
kets, it is also can be implemented on an e-auction plat-
form. In cloud markets, the commodities can be pur-
chased and delivered over the Internet [21]. Cloud users 
often have a variety of application and valuation types 
[22]. Rather than letting resources sit idle, CSPs are also 
inclined to sell unused resources at a reduced price via 
using auctions to users. Because of the above characteris-
tics of cloud, online e-auction is an effective method to 
implement computing resources allocation. Especially, 
the double auction mechanism is more flexible for it sup-
ports buyers and sellers to bid simultaneously. However, 
double auction mechanisms have not been applied in 
cloud markets up till the present moment. 
3 CHALLENGES TO CLOUD MARKETS 
Cloud Computing is emerging nowadays as a commercial 
infrastructure that eliminates the need for maintaining 
expensive computing hardware [23]. Different from Grid 
services which are billed using a fixed rate per service or 
different organizations sharing idle resources, cloud users 
are usually billed using a pay-per-use model [24]. There-
fore market mechanism should be explored to facilitate 
trading between CSPs and users. In this section we ana-
lyze the challenges to the cloud markets and discuss why 
the CDA mechanism is a feasible method to resource al-
location in such markets. At last we provide a scenario to 
describe how to apply the CDA in cloud markets. 
Like other competitive markets, there are several chal-
lenges to cloud computing and storage resources market, 
including the following: 
1. Efficiency: market efficiency can be evaluated by 
the ratio of the surpluses of all traders to the possible 
maximum surpluses that would be obtained in a central-
ized and optimum allocation. An efficient cloud market 
should obtain equilibrium of supply and demand while 
maximizing surpluses of buyers and sellers. 
2. Openness: cloud is a market-oriented computing 
paradigm, which should allow everyone to consume com-
puting and storage resources freely. Therefore a cloud 
market must be an open platform, which can be accessed 
by CSPs/users via the Internet. 
3. Fairness: market rules must be fair to sellers and 
buyers, who can get rational surpluses from trades. A fair 
cloud market will regulate supply and demand of comput-
ing and storage resources, which can also facilitate the 
development of cloud computing. It not only concerns 
market rules, but also deals with tradeoffs of technical 
limits such as virtual machines, network, and so on [25]. 
4 IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON JOURNAL NAME,  MANUSCRIPT ID 
 
4. Feasibility: an efficient and fair market mechanism 
designed for cloud markets should be feasible, which can 
be implemented as an e-commerce platform to help CPSs 
and users trading conveniently. 
The above problems are also general requirements for 
many market mechanisms, including Internet service 
markets [4], wireless spectrum markets [26] and so on. 
Auction mechanisms are usually feasible to solve these 
problems, and the CDA is more efficient and fair than 
single auctions in cloud markets. Cloud users often have 
a variety of application and valuation types, while CSPs 
also have various idle resources. The double auction 
mechanism allows both users and CSPs to submit their 
demands/commodities. Furthermore, the CDA mecha-
nism permits buyers and sellers bidding simultaneously in 
one auction. Advantages of the CDA for cloud markets 
can be revealed in the following scenario shown in Fig. 1. 
For example, a user Tom has a computing job needing 
done in 10 hours (i.e. the deadline of the job is 10 hours) 
and is willing to pay $5 for it (i.e. the budget of the job is 
$5). The job size is estimated to be 40 units. One unit 
means resource capacity of one standard Virtual Machine 
instance running for one hour, which can be predefined as 
a regulation of the cloud electronic CDA platform. Tom 
can publish the demand of the job on the platform. The 
CSPs interested in the demand can submit asks no less 
than their unit costs for executing the job. Tom can not 
only wait for acceptable ask, but also submit his bids no 
more than $5. His first bid is maybe $2, and he submits 
the second bid $4 if no CSPs accept his first bid. Simi-
larly, if another user Peter has the same size and deadline 
job and his valuation for it is $10, he can submit his bids 
for it too. 
During the auction, asks and bids are submitted con-
tinuously. Any new ask must be less than all current asks, 
and any new bid must be more than all current bids. 
When an ask is equal or less than a bid, a transaction oc-
curs. 
 
 
 
Fig. 1. Scenario of CDA in Cloud Computing Markets: Cloud Users 
and CSPs may submit bids and asks anytime. 
In the other hand CSPs can also publish their idle re-
sources on the platform. For example, a CSP ACloud has 
an idle storage space (1TB) for 6 months (from 2013/6/1 
to 2013/12/31), and the cost is $10 with PUT, COPY, 
POST, LIST, GET and all other requests less than 
100,000. ACloud can publish it on the platform. The users 
can bid for it, while other CSPs can submit asks of the 
same storage commodity. 
Apparently the CDA is more efficient and flexible than 
single-sided auction in cloud markets, because it enables 
buyers to enter competitive bidders and sellers to enter 
competitive offers simultaneously. However, to apply 
CDA in real markets there are many detail rules and pub-
lic parameters should be formulated. In next section a 
cloud CDA mechanism are presented. 
4 A CLOUD CDA FRAMEWORK 
The cloud computing market structure considered in this 
paper consists of CSPs, cloud users and the uniform bid-
ding platform. Therefore a complete competitive market 
can be formed. This section presents the solution to re-
source allocation in such a market, including the model of 
cloud CDA mechanism and its market rules. Then an e-
bidding platform scheme is proposed to implement the 
mechanism in real cloud environment. Our cloud CDA 
mechanism is an efficient way of the decentralized alloca-
tion for computing resources. 
4.1 E-CDA Platform to Cloud Markets 
For a huge cloud computing market populated by mil-
lions of users and CSPs, a uniform trading platform is 
vital. As stated above, an electronic bidding platform is a 
feasible solution, which can be easily accessed via the 
Internet and make use of e-Business technologies. Cur-
rently many kinds of commodities are traded on the e-
Business platform, such as electric energy, petroleum, 
stock and so on. 
On such an e-Business platform it is an efficient trad-
ing way that CSPs and users submit their orders simulta-
neously, so the CDA model can be applied. Such an e-
bidding platform plays the role of an auctioneer, on which 
cloud users can submit buy orders (bids), while CSPs can 
submit sell orders (asks). To facilitate the trading the 
computing resources can be valued by a uniform unit, 
which is a homogeneous scenario. 
Therefore we propose a cloud electronic auction plat-
form, which apply the customized CDA mechanism to 
implement pricing and resource allocation in cloud mar-
kets. The essence of the e-CDA platform is how to formu-
late rules of the cloud CDA mechanism, as the following. 
4.2 Model of Cloud CDA Mechanism 
To formulate the cloud CDA mechanism, we firstly ex-
plore some of the basic notions: 
Definition 1. The outstanding bid, obid, is the current 
maximum demand order submitted by a cloud user in 
the market. The outstanding ask, oask, is the current 
minimum offer submitted by a CSP at any given time t 
in the market. 
Solve this 
for $5 
E-CDA Platform 
Solve this 
for $10 
CSP 
CSP 
CSP 
  
  
  
bids asks 
 
 
 
 
Tom 
Peter 
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Definition 2. The trading round, TR, is the period during 
which asks and bids are submitted until there is a 
match and a transaction occurs. There are typically 
several trading rounds in a trading day. At the begin-
ning of the trading round, obid =0 and oask = Max. 
Definition 3. The bid-ask spread, so, is the difference 
between oask and obid, so = oask - obid. 
Definition 4. The limit price, LP, is the maximum bid a 
cloud user is currently willing to pay, and the mini-
mum ask a CSP is willing to supply. 
The cloud CDA mechanism can be thought as a dis-
crete system: transforming a series of discrete input value 
(bids and asks) to a series of discrete output (transaction 
results, i.e. matching of bids and asks). Therefore the 
model can be described as the following: 
, , , ( , , , )TDL Max MinM F B V A C  (1) 
Public Parameters:  
LTD: the length of Trading Day. A trading day, TD, is 
the period during which users and CSPs are allowed to 
submit offers and bids (resulting in transactions whenever 
they match), by the end of which the auction close. 
Δ: the minimum increment of a bid or ask in the market. 
Max: the maximum ask allowed in the market, is to pre-
vent unreasonably high asks and speed up the trading 
process. 
Min: the minimum bid allowed in the market, is to pre-
vent unreasonably low bids and speed up the trading 
process, usually set as 0. 
Input: 
1{ ,..., ,..., }i mB B B B : bid set of m cloud users. Bi is a 
subset containing all bids of cloud user i, and each bid is 
noted as tib  
1{ ,..., ,..., }i mV V V V : limit price set of m cloud users. 
Vi is the limit price of cloud user i, that is the highest bid 
it is willing to pay. Normally Vj is useri’s unit valuation 
for commodity, i.e. redemption value. 
1{ ,..., ,..., }j nA A A A : ask set of n CSPs. Aj is subset 
containing all asks of CSP j, and each ask is noted as tja  
1{ ,..., ,..., }j nC C C C : limit price set of n CSPs. Cj is 
the limit price of CSP j, which is the lowest bid it is will-
ing to submit. Normally Cj is CSPj’s unit cost for the pro-
duction of commodity. 
In this paper the cloud users are supposed to be ra-
tional. Therefore the bid of user i is no more than the 
price it is willing to pay, i.e. 
i iMin b V   (2) 
Accordingly the ask of CSP j is no less than the unit 
cost for the production of commodity, i.e. 
j jC a Max   (3) 
Output: M: the successful transaction matching result 
In such a discrete-time system, a bid or ask is submit-
ted at each step in the market. In this paper, the trading 
day is imposed as the auction closing after given steps. 
At present we only study the cloud CDA mechanism 
and bidding strategy based on following two hypothesises:  
Hypothesis 1. The market is homogeneous, that hosts 
trading in a particular type of commodity where each 
unit traded is functionally identical to every other unit 
traded. 
Hypothesis 2. The cloud users and CSPs have common 
knowledge of rationality and their orders must be sub-
ject to constraint (2) and (3), our cloud CDA is a 
model with constraints. 
To apply our cloud CDA mechanism in competitive 
cloud computing markets, we defined the market rules as 
followed: 
Rule 1. At each step, only one bid or one ask can be sub-
mitted. At any step t, if a bid or ask is submitted, then 
t=t+1. 
Rule 2. Any new bid or ask must improve on the current 
outstanding bid or ask in the market, i.e. 
1 1,t t t tbid askb o a o
    . 
Rule 3. At any step t, if t tbid asko o , then a transaction 
occurs at the price ( ) / 2t tt bid askp o o  . The winning 
cloud user’s revenue is ( )i tV p , and the winning CSP’s 
revenue is ( )t jp C . Then the winning buyer and seller 
are removed from the market. The current round is 
over, and next round begins. 
Rule 4. At any step t, if the cloud user’s (CSP’s) limit 
price is lower (higher) than the current ( )t tbid asko o , it 
cannot submit any bid (ask), and has to wait for the 
beginning of the next round. However, if it can submit 
a bid or ask in the cloud market, it considers its set of 
bidding strategies to form a price. 
Rule 5. If TDt L , the trading is over. 
It is obvious that the bidding strategies play an impor-
tant role in the trading. When a CSP decides a ask price, 
it must take the actions of other CSPs and all cloud users 
into account. And so does a cloud user. In section 4, we 
analyze the bidding strategies of cloud CDA. 
4.3 Implementation of cloud CDA 
The above cloud CDA mechanism is a universal model 
for resources allocation in cloud markets. In real cloud 
markets, the public parameters, LTD, Δ, Max, Min, can be 
regulated according to the requirements of markets. 
Furthermore, current technology on cloud, especially 
Virtual Machines, makes it easy to divide computing re-
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sources to commodities. For example, a commodity in 
cloud markets maybe a time period of using a VM in-
stance, some resource for running a scientific computing 
program in given time. Whatever a commodity is, CSPs 
can divide it to users. 
The cloud CDA mechanism is practical in the real 
situation: cloud users (or user brokers) and CSPs can 
submit orders to an e-bidding platform via the Internet. 
We design such a scheme as shown in Fig. 3. 
 
 
 
Fig. 3. Electronic Bidding Scheme in Cloud Computing Markets 
The electronic bidding scheme in above figure is the 
public auction (outcry), where the bidding and asking 
prices of computing resources are public. For each bid, 
the lasted bid must be higher than all bids in the previous 
round of bidding. Similarly the most recent ask must be 
lower than all asks in the previous round. To facilitate 
cloud users’ bidding, cloud users can authorize User Bro-
kers (UBs) to bid for them on the e-bidding platform. 
CSPs usually have their agents in charge of bidding on 
the platform. 
The auction on the e-bidding platform can be divided 
into 3 states: the registration stage, the bidding stage and 
the transaction decision stage. In the registration stage, 
the information of all computing resources and the related 
parameters of cloud users and CSPs are presented on the 
bulletin board, and every player is certified by the e-
bidding platform. Then in the bidding stage, the UBs can 
submit bids and CSPs’ agents can submit asks. Eventually, 
the highest bid and the lowest ask are matched by the 
cloud CDA decision module in the auction. 
4.4 Evaluation Criteria 
The objective of our cloud CDA mechanism is to maxi-
mize the profits of cloud users and CSPs. In such com-
petitive markets, the market equilibrium occurs when 
demand meets supply in a free cloud computing market. 
According to classical micro-economic theory, the trans-
action prices in the CDA are then expected to converge 
towards that competitive equilibrium price p*. 
Therefore we design three criteria to evaluate the trade 
model and bid strategies. The market efficiency, emarket, is 
the ratio of the surpluses of all traders (i.e. cloud users 
and CSPs) to the possible maximum surpluses that would 
be obtained in a centralized and optimum allocation. The 
efficiency of a bidding strategy, es, is the ratio of the sur-
pluses of traders adopting that strategy during a trading 
day to the maximum surpluses these traders could extract 
in a centralized allocation. In the homogeneous scenario, 
this is identical to the market efficiency, i.e. market se e . 
The daily price volatility,  , shows how the transaction 
prices converge to the equilibrium price p*. It is defined 
as: 
* 2
1
*
( )1
N
ii
p p
p N
   
 (4) 
As stated above, the cloud computing market is a com-
petitive market, in which the competitive equilibrium 
price p* is decided by supply and demand together. The 
market-clearing is achieved at the equilibrium price p*. 
Apparently p* cannot be known prior in this case because 
of the decentralized nature of the cloud CDA. 
However to evaluate market efficiency (strategy effi-
ciency) and price volatility, it is necessary to compute the 
approximation of the equilibrium price and the possible 
maximum surpluses, which would be obtained in a cen-
tralized and optimum allocation. This paper uses the Mar-
shallian Path [27] to get an optimum allocation. 
 
 
Fig. 2. Flowchart of Marshallian Path. Input parameters are buyers’ 
values and sellers’ costs. Output are successful trades. 
According to the "invisible hand" theory in economics, 
after enough trading round buyers and sellers can achieve 
the equilibrium price and equilibrium quantity. The Mar-
shallian path provides a theoretic description of how to 
Start 
End 
Find out the maximum valuation Vmax in 
buyer valuation set V, and the minimum 
cost Cmin in seller cost set C  
Transaction occurs.  
Remove Vmax from V and Cmin from C 
Vmax ≥Cmin No 
Yes 
Bidding Platform 
Publish: 
●Public parameters 
●Information of  
resources 
CSP 
Initialization 
User  
Broker 
Agent 
Bulletin Board 
… 
… 
…. 
Bids 
… 
… 
…. 
Asks 
Bids Asks 
… 
… 
…. 
… 
… 
…. 
Cloud CDA 
Decision 
Mutual Authentica-
tion, Registration 
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achieve the equilibrium. Therefore the last transaction 
price in Marshallian path can be used as the approxima-
tion of the equilibrium price to evaluate performance of 
our cloud CDA market. 
The Marshallian path is simply a sequence of trades 
from left to right along the supply and demand curves. If 
the maximum valuation of a buyer is equal to or more 
than the minimum cost of a seller, transaction occurs. The 
action is repeated until there is no valuation is equal to or 
more than a cost. The flowchart is shown in Fig. 2. 
For example, the values of 16 buyers ranked in de-
scending order are: 140, 125, 110, 95, 80, 85, 50, 45, 40, 
35, 30, 25, 20, 15, 10, 5. And the costs of 16 sellers 
ranked in ascending order are: 30, 35, 40, 50, 55, 60, 65, 
70, 75, 80, 85, 90, 95, 100, 105. Then the Marshallian 
path theory predicts the following sequence of trades as 
shown in table 1. 
TABLE 1 
TRADES PREDICTED BY MARSHALLIAN PATH 
Trade 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Buyer 140 125 110 95 80 65 
Seller 30 35 40 45 50 55 
 
No further trades are possible because the next buyer 
has a value (50) less than the seller’s cost (60). Trade 
prices can vary anywhere between a buyer’s unit value 
and the seller’s unit cost. Thus, the initial possible range 
of prices is quite wide (30-140), but the possible range of 
prices is forced closer to the equilibrium. As trading pro-
gresses, the final trade (55-65) is constrained to be near 
the competitive equilibrium (55<P<60). 
Thus an optimum allocation can be achieved using the 
Marshallian Path. To evaluate the efficiency of our cloud 
market and bidding strategy, it is a feasible way to use the 
allocation as a benchmark. 
In the actual trading scenario, each trader can win one 
or more transactions, but in Marshallian Path each buyer 
or seller can only buy or sell once. We can compute the 
average surplus of one transaction. Therefore the market 
efficiency, emarket, can be rewritten as: 
,,
, ,
( / )( / )
( ) / 2
s j sb i b
ji
market MP MP
b i s j
i j
S nS n
e
S S
 

 
 (5) 
,b iS  is total surpluses are won by buyer i, bn  is maxi-
mum of trading rounds of all buyers in a CDA market. 
Accordingly ,s jS  and sn  are values of sellers in a CDA 
market. 
,
MP
b i
i
S , ,MPs j
j
S  are buyers’ and sellers’ total sur-
pluses in the Marshallian Path respectively. Especially, 
, ,( / ) /
MP
b i i b i
i i
S n S   is buyers’ efficiency, and 
, ,( / ) /
MP
s j j s j
j j
S n S   is sellers’ efficiency. Our cloud com-
puting market is a homogeneous market, so s markete e . 
Because the transaction price of the final trade in Mar-
shallian Path, pMP, is close to the equilibrium price p*, the 
daily price volatility,  , can be calculated with pMP, as 
2
1
( )1
N MP
ii
MP
p p
p N
     (6) 
In Section 5 (5) and (6) are used to evaluate our cloud 
CDA market and BH-strategy. 
5 BELIEF-BASED HYBRID STRATEGY 
Our e-CDA platform provides a feasible solution to cloud 
resource allocation and pricing. On such the platform, the 
selection of bidding strategies for the auction plays a very 
important role for each player to maximize its own profit. 
Furthermore, based on bidding strategies software agents 
can be designed to accomplish autonomous auctions for 
buyers and sellers. 
Therefore we proposed a novel bidding strategy, Be-
lief-based Hybrid Strategy (BH-strategy) appropriate for 
the cloud CDA mechanism. BH-strategy introduces an 
improved beliefs function and uses evolutionary pro-
gramming to decide strategy dynamically. In this section, 
we describe BH-strategy in detail. 
5.1 Beliefs Function 
All Cloud users and CSPs attempt to maximize their sur-
pluses in cloud computing market. However only when 
bids or asks are accepted and a transaction occurs, cloud 
users and CSPs can obtain surpluses. Therefore UBs or 
CSPs’ agents must evaluate the probability of these bids 
or asks being accepted by other sellers or buyers, i.e. be-
liefs. It is a feasible method to form beliefs based on his-
tory trade records. 
Gjerstad and Dickhuat [17] proposed a GD model, in 
which the trading activity is resulted from beliefs. Using 
the beliefs function, beliefs are formed on the basis of 
observed market data, including frequencies of asks, bids, 
accepted asks and accepted bids. 
The work of Gjerstad and Dickhuat is flexible enough 
to respond quickly to changes in supply and demand con-
ditions. But it is difficult for each buyer and seller to col-
lect and calculate the history records (the recent L trading 
rounds). Moreover, their simulations showed that for long 
memory lengths ( 8)L   the outcomes are similar to those 
with intermediate memory lengths (4 7)L  , but compu-
tation time increases significantly. 
To reduce the computation time and costs, this paper 
introduced an improved beliefs function. It also forms 
beliefs based on history trading, but dose not need all 
details of the history bids and asks. It calculates the esti-
mate of the competitive equilibrium price p* using recent 
transaction prices, and then forms the sellers’ and buyers’ 
beliefs according to the estimate of p*. 
Furthermore, our beliefs functions for both sellers and 
buyers are piecewise-defined. Generally transaction 
prices converge to the competitive equilibrium price p*. 
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If at any time *asko p  the sellers should be less ag-
gressive to submit a new ask a. Similarly, if at any time 
*bido p  the buyers should be less aggressive to submit 
a new bid b. Therefore the beliefs function should be de-
fined by two sub-functions, and each sub-function is ap-
plied to a certain interval of the main function's domain (a 
sub-domain). The main domain should be divided into 
two sub-domains at the point p*. As noted in section 3, 
the competitive equilibrium price p* can not be known in 
advance, in our work the main domain is divided at the 
estimate of p*. 
We can use the moving average method to calculate 
the estimate of p* based on the history transaction prices. 
According to [11], the moving average is an objective 
analytical tool that gives the average value over a time 
frame spanning from the last transaction. It is sensitive to 
price changes over a short time frame, but over a longer 
time span, is less sensitive and filters out the high-
frequency components of the signal within the frame. 
Different from [11], this paper uses the weighted moving 
average method to calculate the estimate of the competi-
tive equilibrium price, denoted by ^*p . 
Therefore given a set of latest HN transaction prices, 
(11) describes how to get ^*p : 
^
1
1
( )
* ,
1 2 ...
1,..., ( ),...,
T
i i
i T HN
T HN i T
w p
p
HN
where w w i T HN w HN
  
 

   
      

 (7) 
1( ,..., )T HN Tw w   is the weight given to latest HN  
transaction prices 1( ,..., )T HN Tp p  , and T is the latest 
transaction. If there is no transaction occurring before, 
then 
^
* 0p  . 
Our improved SELLERS’ BELIEFS: 
^
^
^
1 *
( ) ( ) ( ) *
( ) ( ) ( )
if a p
p a TAG a BG a if Max a p
TAG a BG a RAL a
           
 (8) 
Apparently the function 
^
( )p a  should be monotoni-
cally non-increasing. In fact only when a seller submits 
an ask a Min (Min is the minimum bid allowed in the 
market, defined in section 4.2), the probability of a ac-
cepted by another buyer is 1, i.e. 
^
( ) 1p Min  . In GD 
model [17] the sellers’ beliefs curve is smooth and de-
creasing at interval ( , ]Min Max , as shown in Fig. 4. 
But in our work the bidding game is thought to consist 
of two stages: the aggressive stage and the unaggressive 
stage. Sellers take different actions in each stage. When 
^
*asko p  a seller can be more aggressive, i.e. in the ag-
gressive stage the seller chooses the best ask based on 
belief. At interval 
^
( *, ]p Max  the seller’s belief is com-
puted using history bid and ask records. When 
^
*asko p  
a seller can be less aggressive, i.e. in the unaggressive 
stage the seller chooses the best ask without taking his-
tory records into account. At interval 
^
[ , *]Min p  the seller’s 
belief is set to be a fixed value 1 to reduce computing 
costs. Therefore our sellers’ beliefs function is a piece-
wise function, as shown in Fig. 4. 
 
(a) GD strategy                                (b) BH strategy 
Fig. 4. Sellers Beliefs Curves: (a) is sellers’ beliefs curve of GD strat-
egy, (b) is our improved sellers’ beliefs curve for BH strategy. 
To reduce computation complexity, the sellers’ beliefs 
at interval 
^
( *, ]p Max  can be fitted a polynomial based on 
history transaction data. Our statistical experiments find 
that a cubic polynomial is good enough. Therefore our 
SELLERS’ BELIEFS can be rewritten as: 
^
^
^
3 2
1 2 3 4
1 *
( )
*
if a p
p a
p a p a p a p if Max a p
           
 (9) 
In (9) p1, p2, p3, p4 will be fixed by analyzing history 
transaction data in a given market populated by N sellers 
and M buyers. 
Our improved BUYERS’ BELIEFS: 
^
^
^
( ) ( ) *
( ) ( ) ( )( )
1 *
TBL b AL b if Min b p
TBL b AL b RBG bq b
if b p
          
 (10) 
^
( )q b  is monotonically non-decreasing. In fact only 
when a buyer submits a bid b Max (Max is the maxi-
mum ask allowed in the market), the probability of b 
accepted by another seller is 1, i.e. 
^
( ) 1q Max  . In GD 
model the buyers’ beliefs curve is smooth and increasing 
at interval ( , ]Min Max , as shown in Fig. 5. 
 
       (a) GD strategy                                      (b) BH strategy 
Fig. 5. Buyers Beliefs Curves: (a) is buyers’ beliefs curve of GD 
strategy, (b) is our improved buyers’ beliefs curve for BH strategy. 
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In our two-stage bidding game, when 
^
*bido p  a buyer 
can be more aggressive, i.e. in the aggressive stage the 
buyer chooses the best ask based on belief. At interval 
^
[ , *)Min p  the buyer’s belief is computed using history bid 
and ask records. When 
^
*bido p  a buyer can be less ag-
gressive, i.e. in the unaggressive stage the buyer chooses 
the best ask without taking history records into account. 
At interval 
^
[ *, ]p Max  the buyer’s belief is set to be a 
fixed value 1 to reduce computing costs. Therefore our 
buyers’ beliefs function is a piecewise function, as shown 
in Fig. 5. 
Similarly, the buyers’ beliefs at interval 
^
[ , *)Min p  can 
also be fitted a cubic polynomial as followed: 
^
3 2^
1 2 3 4
^
*
( )
1 *
q b q b q b q if Min b p
q b
if b p
           
 (11) 
5.2 BH-Strategy 
Based on our improved beliefs functions, the buyers or 
sellers take different actions at different game stages. 
5.2.1 Aggressive Stage 
If 
^
*asko p , sellers should be in the aggressive stage. A 
seller should compute a best ask based on improved be-
liefs function. Sellers’ Expected Surplus is defined as 
followed: 
^
, max{max [( ) ( )],0}s j a jS a C p a   (12) 
For seller j, its best ask is ja , maximizing ,s jS . Sub-
stituting (9) to (12), we have: 
3 2
1 2 3 4arg max{( )( )}j ja a C p a p a p a p      (13) 
If 
^
*bido p , buyers should be in the aggressive stage. 
Buyers’ Expected Surplus is defined as the following: 
^
, max{max [( ) ( )],0}b i b iS V b q b   (14) 
For buy i, its best bid is ib  maximizing ,b iS , i.e. 
3 2
1 2 3 4arg max{( )( )}i ib V b q b q b q b q      (15) 
5.2.2 Unaggressive Stage 
If 
^
*asko p , sellers should be in the unaggressive stage. 
Similarly, if 
^
*bido p , buyers should be in the unaggres-
sive stage. When in this stage a seller or buyer submits a 
new ask or bid, which means it will accept a worse price 
than history traders did. 
For example a seller j submits an ask aska o . If the 
ask a is accepted, the seller j can be thought to lose the 
surplus jLoss compared with history trading price: 
^ ^
( * ) ( ) *j j jLoss p C a C p a       (16) 
We assume it is rational for a seller to decide the best 
ask a based on whether it has been submitted or accepted 
in history trading round. So does a buyer. 
Furthermore, in our cloud CDA mechanism asks or 
bids submitted by traders must be subject to constraints (2) 
and (3). When 
^
*asko p , the interval [ , )j askC o has 
already been too small to provide the seller j with more 
choice. Similarly when 
^
*bido p , the interval ( , )bid io V  
has been also too small. 
Therefore in unaggressive stage a seller just submits a 
random ask as followed: 
~ ( , )j j aska U C o  (17) 
( , )j askU C o  is the uniform distribution. 
A buyer submits a random bid as followed: 
~ ( , )i bid ib U o V  (18) 
Similarly, ( , )bid iU o V is the uniform distribution. 
5.2.3 First Round 
In our two-stage bidding game, the sellers take aggressive 
or unaggressive actions depending on whether the current 
oask is greater than 
^
*p  or not. So do the buyers. 
But in the first trade round no transaction occurs, so 
^
*p  can not be estimated. The seller or buyer has no his-
tory trading information other than its limit price. If the 
seller j submits a too low ask, it can transact at a not very 
profitable price (with respect to p*). Therefore, it starts 
with high asks that progressively approach the maximum 
of its cost price Cj and the outstanding bid obid to explore 
the market. Similarly the buyer i submits a bid towards 
the minimum of its valuation Vi and the outstanding ask 
oask to explore the market. 
Therefore we defined bid rules in the first trading 
round by adopting method of [11]. The seller j should 
submit aj in the first trading round as following: 
max{ , }ask j bid
j ask
o C o
a o 
   (19) 
And buyer i should submit bi in the first trading round 
as following: 
min{ , }i ask bid
i bid
V o ob o 
   (20) 
Thus the bid-ask spread so is reduced with an expo-
nentially decreasing trend determined by η and its limit 
price. Here a low η implies a faster rate of convergence of 
bids or asks until they are matched at a transaction price. 
Conversely, a high η implies a more conservative bidding 
approach and a slower convergence. According to [11], 
3  was observed to be a good compromise. Therefore 
in the first trading round we set 3   and compute ask 
and bid using (19) and (20). 
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5.2.4 BH-strategy 
Therefore the Belief-based Hybrid Strategy can be de-
scribed as the following: 
 
Bidding Strategy for Seller j: 
If ( j askC o ) submit no ask 
Else 
    If (first trading round, 
^
* 0p  ) submit an ask given by (19) 
    Else 
        If (
^
*asko p )     /*aggressive stage*/ 
submit an ask computed by (13) 
        Else              /*unaggressive stage*/ 
submit an ask given by (17) 
        End If 
    End If 
End If 
 
Bidding Strategy for Buyer i: 
If ( i bidV o ) submit no bid 
Else 
    If (first trading round, 
^
* 0p  ) submit a bid given by (20 
    Else 
        If (
^
*bido p )    /*aggressive stage*/ 
submit a bid computed by (15) 
        Else              /*unaggressive stage*/ 
submit a bid given by (18) 
        End If 
    End If 
End If 
 
As shown above, at the first trading round the BH buy-
ers and sellers have no information of history trading, so 
they submit orders based on the current outstanding or-
ders and their limit prices. 
From the second trading round 
^
*p  can be computed 
and BH buyers and sellers take different bidding strate-
gies according to 
^
*p . 
6 SIMULATION AND EVALUATION 
In this section, we first detail the design of simulation for 
analyzing the strategic interaction of the BH-strategy in 
cloud CDA markets. Especially we compare our strategy 
with ZI strategy, GD strategy and AA strategy. Then the 
actual empirical study of performance is given. 
6.1 Simulation Design 
We simulate scenarios with three different kinds of scales 
to evaluate our strategy in Matlab.  
In the small simulation scenario the market is popu-
lated with a set of 10 buyers and 10 sellers on a same 
scale with [11]. In the large simulation scenario, there are 
100 buyers and 100 sellers in the market. In actual cloud 
computing markets there are often more cloud user bro-
kers than CSPs’ agents. Therefore we design the third 
scenario, the asymmetric scenario, populated with a set of 
1000 buyers and 10 sellers. 
For each scenario we simulate 30 trading days, and the 
length of each trading day is 1000. After 1000 steps (a bid 
or an ask is submitted), the trading is over and all bids 
and asks are cleared. 
The buyers’ values and sellers’ costs are uniformed 
random numbers between 1 and the amount of sellers. In 
the small simulation scenario , ~ (1,10)V C U . In the large 
simulation scenario , ~ (1,100)V C U . In the asymmetric 
scenario , ~ (1,10)V C U . 
The minimum increment of bid or ask Δ is an infinitely 
small quantity, i.e. a buyer/seller can submit a new 
bid/ask greater than obid /oask. The minimum bid allowed 
in the market Min=0. The maximum ask allowed in the 
market 10 sMax N  (Ns is amount of sellers). Table 2 
provides simulation parameters in the three scenarios. 
TABLE 2 
PARAMETERS IN THREE SIMULATION SCENARIOS 
Parameter Small Large Asymmetric
Buyers 10 100 1000 
Sellers 10 100 10 
V U(1,10) U(1,100) U(1,10) 
C U(1,10) U(1,100) U(1,10) 
∆ ε ε ε 
Min 0 0 0 
Max 100 1000 100 
LTD 1000 10000 10000 
Trading Day 30 30 30 
ε is an infinitely small quantity. LTD is step amount in a trading day.  
 
The above three scenarios include simulations used 
frequently in related works, such as [11] used the first 
scenario, and [20] also applied uniformed random num-
bers to simulate values and costs. Furthermore, they rep-
resent the feature of real cloud markets, which will be 
addressed in section 6.4. 
6.2 Benchmark 
To evaluate BH-strategy, we will compare it with ZI strat-
egy, GD strategy and AA strategy. 
ZI strategy by Gode and Sunder [15] makes a uni-
formed, but profitable decision that is not based on ob-
served market information. A ZI buyer submits an offer 
drawn from a uniform distribution between the minimum 
bid allowed in the market and its valuation, and a ZI 
seller between its cost and the maximum ask allowed in 
the market. Although ZI is a nonintelligent strategy, it is 
sufficient to raise the allocative efficiency of CDA more 
than 90%. Therefore ZI model is usually used as the 
benchmark when evaluating the CDA biding strategies 
[11, 16, 18, 20]. 
GD strategy [17] is an expected profit-maximizing and 
belief-based strategy. It calculates its belief that a bid or 
ask will be accepted in the market based on a set of the 
latest transactions and the expected profit associated with 
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such bids and asks. Then, the bid or ask that maximizes 
the expected profit is submitted in the market. Our BH-
strategy improves the beliefs function of GD, so we also 
compare our work with GD. 
AA (Adaptive Aggressive) strategy [11] is based on 
both short and long-term learning that allow agents to 
modify their bidding behavior to be efficient in a market. 
For the short-term learning, the agent updates the aggres-
siveness of its bidding behavior based on market informa-
tion observed after any bid or ask appears in the markets. 
The long-term learning determines how this aggressive-
ness factor influences an agent’s choice in the market, 
and is based on market information observed after every 
successful transaction. As shown in [11] AA has better 
performance than other strategies, so we also use AA as 
the benchmark. In our simulation, sellers’ costs and buy-
ers’ valuations are generated every trading day, so we 
only compare short-term learning AA strategy with our 
BH-strategy. 
6.3 Evaluation 
Successful transactions, surpluses, market efficiency (i.e. 
strategy efficiency in homogeneous markets), daily price 
volatility and executing time are evaluated to assess the 
performance of our cloud CDA market and BH-strategy. 
These are also the general evaluation criteria in related 
researches on auction mechanisms [11]. As stated above, 
we design three simulation scenarios: small, large and 
asymmetric scenario. We will measure these five criteria 
in each scenario respectively. 
6.3.1 Successful Transactions 
The number of successful transactions in one trading day 
is basic measurements of the auction efficiency. Because 
our cloud CDA market is a model with constraints, if 
transaction occurs both the winning seller and buyer ob-
tain surpluses. It means that more successful transactions 
cause more total surpluses. 
In the small and the large scenario ZI ranks first and 
BH second, and in the asymmetric scenario BH ranks 
first (see Appendix A). To illustrate them clearly, table 3 
gives the average of daily successful transactions in these 
three scenarios. 
TABLE 3 
THE AVERAGE OF DAILY TRANSACTIONS 
Strategy Small Large Asymmetric
ZI 452 8326 6606 
GD 228 677 3535 
AA 305 4570 6560 
BH 367 6679 7685 
 
We observe that BH has overwhelmingly more suc-
cessful transactions than GD, and also a little more than 
AA in all the three scenarios. ZI is a non-intelligent bid-
ding strategy, so it has usually more successful transac-
tions. However, in the asymmetric scenario BH has more 
transactions than ZI. 
6.3.2 Surpluses of Sellers and Buyers 
Every market mechanism aims at maximizing surpluses 
or profits attained by sellers and buyers in the market. We 
select three kinds of surplus criteria: daily sellers’ surplus, 
buyers’ surplus and total surpluses (the sum of sellers’ 
surplus and buyers’ surplus). Daily surpluses depend on 
the number of transactions and prices. Therefore it takes a 
global view of 4 bidding strategies by empirical study on 
these surplus criteria. 
Fig. 6 offers total surpluses (sellers’ surplus plus buy-
ers’ surplus) of ZI, GD, AA and BH in three scenarios. 
The details of the sellers’ and the buyers’ surplus are 
given in Appendix A respectively. 
According to the experiment results, AA strategy ob-
tains the most sellers’ surplus of all and BH strategy ob-
tains the most buyers’ surplus. But considering sellers’ 
and buyers’ surpluses together, BH obtains the most in all 
the three scenarios. 
6.3.3 Efficiency 
As defined in Section 3, market efficiency is the ratio of 
the surpluses of all traders to the possible maximum sur-
pluses that would be obtained in a centralized and opti-
mum allocation. 
Table 4 gives the average market efficiency: 
TABLE 4 
THE AVERAGE MARKET EFFICIENCY 
Strategy Small Large Asymmetric
ZI 0.8500 0.1430 0.7215 
GD 0.8636 0.3081 0.6932 
AA 0.9137 0.3420 0.8239 
BH 0.9230 0.3542 0.8305 
 
As shown in table 4, the average market efficiency of 
BH ranks first in all three scenarios. The details of daily 
market efficiency are shown in appendix A. 
6.3.4 Daily Price Volatility 
Daily price volatility,  , shows how the transaction 
prices converge to the equilibrium price. Fig. 16 gives the 
daily price volatility of ZI, GD, AA and BH in the three 
scenarios. 
As shown in Fig. 7 average  of our BH is the small-
est in the small scenario, and average  of AA is the s-
mallest in the other two scenarios. Although AA is doing 
best on average daily price volatility, our BH is doing 
much better than GD and ZI. 
To demonstrate how transaction prices distribute, Fig. 
13 gives transaction prices in one trading day. In this fig-
ure MP denotes equilibrium price found by Marshallian 
Path. Therefore all dots of MP form a line, called MP-line. 
The faster transaction prices converge to MP-line, the 
smaller the daily price volatility is. 
Fig. 8 shows how BH converges to equilibrium price. 
Although the daily price volatility of BH is not obviously 
smaller than AA, the difference among transaction prices 
in one trading day of BH is smaller than the others. 
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(b) Large Simulation Scenario 
0 5 10 15 20 25 30
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
x 104
Trading day
A
ll 
S
ur
pl
us
 
 
ZI
GD
AA
BH
 
(c) Asymmetric Simulation Scenario 
Fig. 6. Total Surpluses Evaluation 
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(a) Small Simulation Scenario 
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(b) Large Simulation Scenario 
0 5 10 15 20 25 30
0.05
0.1
0.15
0.2
0.25
0.3
0.35
0.4
0.45
0.5
Trading day
D
ai
ly
 P
ric
e 
V
ol
at
ili
ty
 
 
ZI
GD
AA
BH
 
(c) Asymmetric Simulation Scenario 
Fig. 7. Daily Price Volatility 
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(a) Small Simulation Scenario 
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(b) Large Simulation Scenario 
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(c) Asymmetric Simulation Scenario 
Fig. 8. Transaction Prices in One Trading Day 
6.3.5 Executing Time 
When a trader adopts a bidding strategy, it will execute 
the strategy algorithm to find the best offer. Therefore the 
algorithm time complexity is a key factor of the trading 
costs. Especially on real cloud e-CDA platform, users and 
CSPs may adopt software agents to trade automatically, 
so a low time cost algorithm is very important. 
We use simulation executing time in Matlab to evalu-
ate it. The start and the end time are serial date numbers 
defined in Matlab, and their difference is the executing 
time. Fig. 9 provides the executing time of ZI, GD, AA 
and BH in the three simulation scenarios. 
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Fig. 9. Executing Time: x=1, 2, 3 represent small scenario, large 
scenario and asymmetric scenario. 
As shown in Fig. 9, the executing time of GD is the 
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longest in all scenarios because of finding a local maxi-
mum of expected surplus function. Our BH reduces the 
executing time comparing to GD. Although BH needs a 
longer executing time than AA, BH has higher efficiency 
than AA. In experiments it takes some time for MATLAB 
to generate random bids, so the executing time of ZI is 
not short. But in actual auction, if a trader takes ZI strat-
egy it does not need to compute. 
6.3.6 Summary of Simulations 
The summary of above the simulation is listed in table 5: 
TABLE 5 
THE SUMMARY OF SIMULATIONS 
Criteria Experiment Results 
Successful 
Transactions 
BH has more successful transactions than GD 
and AA in the three scenarios. Although in the 
small and the large scenario BH is less good 
than ZI, in the asymmetric scenario BH has 
more transactions than ZI. 
Surpluses AA strategy obtains the most sellers’ surplus of 
all and BH strategy obtains the most buyers’ 
surplus. But considering sellers’ and buyers’ 
surpluses together, BH obtains the most in 
three scenarios. 
Efficiency The average market efficiency of BH is the 
largest in the three scenarios 
Daily Price 
Volatility   Average  of our BH is the smallest in the small scenario, and AA’s is the smallest in the 
other two scenarios. Although AA is doing best 
on average daily price volatility, our BH is do-
ing much better than GD and ZI. 
Daily Price 
Difference 
Although average daily price volatility of BH is 
not obviously smaller than AA, the difference 
among transaction prices in one trading day of 
BH is smaller than the others. 
 
By analyzing the results we can conclude that BH per-
forms the best in all the scenarios on surpluses, market 
efficiency and daily price difference. For successful trans-
actions, BH ranks the second while ZI the first. But ZI is 
a nonintelligent strategy and BH is overwhelmingly better 
than ZI in other aspects. For daily price volatility, BH 
ranks the second while AA the first. But it only shows the 
difference between transaction prices and equilibrium 
prices estimated by Marshallian Path. Because the differ-
ence among transaction prices in one trading day of BH is 
smaller than the other strategies, it is also acceptable. 
6.4 Feasibility in Real Cloud Markets 
Our simulations only consist of 3 scenarios, but the re-
sults also prove the feasibility of our cloud CDA mecha-
nism in real cloud markets. Though there are more users 
in real cloud markets than our simulations, in each auc-
tion not all users participate in. Therefore, the scale of 
each auction in real cloud markets is close to one of our 
simulation scenarios. For example, when a CSP published 
one of its idle VM instances, maybe only several users 
took part in the auction to bid it. 
To illustrate why the cloud CDA mechanism is feasible, 
we analyze features of commodities and buyers in real 
cloud markets as the following: 
1. Homogeneous Commodities: Sellers in cloud mar-
kets are CSPs, who provide users with computing and 
storage resources, i.e. commodities. On our e-CDA plat-
form auction commodities should be traded with uniform 
units, i.e. a standard measurement approach to computing 
and storage. Despite the difference of the physical ma-
chine and storage medium among CSPs, a system of unit 
for cloud resource can be predefined and approved by 
both buyers and sellers. 
The unit for computing service can be a VM instance 
with fixed CPU, I/O, memory, and network bandwidth. For 
instance, Amazon EC2 defined "EC2 Compute Units" or 
ECUs, as a measure of virtual computing power. The e-CDA 
platform can also define one VM instance as a standard unit 
of computing power, named Compute Unit (CU). Therefore 
a computing commodity can be described as 40 CUs. Owing 
to the development of Virtualization Technology, it is feasi-
ble for CSPs to create VM instances and operating costs of 
the VM management will be considerably reduced. 
The unit for storage service is also designed in the 
same way. Like Amazon S3, the Storage Unit (SU) can be 
1TB/month with fixed number of GET, PUT, COPY, 
POST, or LIST requests. For example a storage commod-
ity can be represented as 10 SUs. Similarly, current stor-
age technology makes it easy to allocate a maximum 
amount of storage space and requests that a user can use. 
With the above standard system of units for computing 
and storage, the commodities traded on the e-CDA plat-
form can be deemed as homogeneous. Therefore the 
cloud CDA mechanism can be applied. 
2. Heterogeneous User Demands: Buyers in cloud 
markets are cloud users, who may differ in their service 
requirements and valuation parameters. According to [9, 
22], cloud users can be classified into 2 categories: Job-
oriented users and Resource-aggressive users. 
Job-oriented users often have batch jobs, which need a 
certain computation to be carried out, and the computa-
tion time scales with the allocated resources. Such jobs 
are common, for example, in scientific and business 
computing. Such a user can submit his/her demand of a 
computing job, including size, available time and dead-
line, on the e-CDA platform. Then the platform initiates 
an auction for it. The user can submit bids less than the 
budget of the job. If the CSPs have idle resources to sat-
isfy the demand, they can submit asks more than their 
costs. Other users also can submit bids for it.  
Resource-aggressive users often have fixed duration 
applications. In certain application classes, cloud re-
sources may be secured for fixed periods of time. For 
example, a small ICP (Internet Content Provider) needs a 
VM instance to host a web site for one year, or a user 
buys 1TB storage for six months as online backup. Such 
demands can also be described as concise request to fit 
for publishing on the e-CDA platform. 
In summary the features of commodities and users in 
real cloud markets make it feasible adopting CDA to allo-
cate cloud resources. Cloud resources can be measured 
with uniform units and heterogeneous user demands can 
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be described as concise request, therefore the cloud users 
and CSPs can trade on the e-CDA platform. 
7 CONCLUSION 
Cloud computing is a new and promising paradigm deliv-
ering IT services as computing utilities. In such enormous 
computing resources markets, CDA is an effective 
method to decentralized allocation. 
In this paper a cloud Continuous Double Auction 
(CDA) mechanism is brought for cloud resources alloca-
tion. We define the market rules to match orders and fa-
cilitate trading, and introduce evaluation criteria to meas-
ure performance. Furthermore, we design an electronic 
bidding platform to implement this mechanism in the 
cloud environment. Then we develop a novel bidding 
strategy for cloud CDA, BH-strategy, which is a two-
stage game bidding strategy based on improved beliefs 
function. In the aggressive stage it decides the trading 
activity based on the improved beliefs function. In the 
unaggressive stage it chooses the best action according to 
static rules. 
By simulation we compare our BH-strategy with other 
typical strategies in successful transactions, surpluses, 
market efficiency, daily price volatility and executing 
time in three simulation scenarios: small, large and 
asymmetric scenario. BH-strategy has better performance 
on surpluses, successful transactions and market effi-
ciency. Especially, it largely improves market efficiency 
in the asymmetric scenario which is closer to the actual 
cloud market. 
Furthermore, we discuss the feasibility of our CDA 
cloud mechanism in real cloud markets. The analysis 
demonstrates it is a feasible market for cloud computing 
resource allocation. 
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APPENDIX A. EMPIRICAL STUDY IN THE THREE SCENARIOS 
In section 6, we benchmarked our BH-strategy against the ZI, GD and AA strategies for the three scenarios. Here, we 
provide the details of daily successful transactions, sellers’ surplus, buyers’ surplus and market efficiency which have 
not been presented in the main body of the paper. 
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(a) Small Simulation Scenario 
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(b) Large Simulation Scenario 
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(c) Asymmetric Simulation Scenario 
Fig. A.1. Successful Transactions 
As shown above in the small and the large scenario ZI ranks first and BH second, and in the asymmetric scenario 
BH ranks first. 
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(a) Small Simulation Scenario 
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(b) Large Simulation Scenario 
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(c) Asymmetric Simulation Scenario 
Fig. A.2. Sellers Surplus Evaluation 
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(a) Small Simulation Scenario 
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(b) Large Simulation Scenario 
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(c) Asymmetric Simulation Scenario 
Fig. A.3. Buyers Surplus Evaluation 
Fig. A.2 gives the sellers’ surpluses of ZI, GD, AA and BH in these three scenarios. Fig. A.3 shows the buyers’ sur-
pluses of ZI, GD, AA and BH in these three scenarios. According to the experiment results, AA strategy obtains the 
most sellers’ surpluses of all and BH strategy obtains the most buyers’ surpluses. But considering sellers’ and buyers’ 
surpluses together, BH obtains the most in all the three scenarios. 
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(a) Small Simulation Scenario 
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(b) Large Simulation Scenario 
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(c) Asymmetric Simulation Scenario 
Fig. A.4. Market Efficiency Evaluation 
Fig. A.4 provides the daily efficiency of ZI, GD, AA and BH in all the three scenarios. The average market effi-
ciency of BH ranks first in all three scenarios. 
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